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Abstract 
 
 
This paper discusses corporate philanthropy as practiced by Salvadoran companies in El 
Salvador.  I review the literature that discusses trends and models of corporate philanthropy to 
highlight some of the motives companies may have to participate in charitable activities.  I 
provide a history of the Salvadoran private sector to furnish a context that may help us understand 
philanthropic activity today.  Next, I propose a model that may explain contemporary Salvadoran 
corporate philanthropy.  The model is based on two propositions:  that philanthropic acts by 
Salvadoran firms are positioned simultaneously as altruistic and politically strategic activities, 
and reflect individualism and paternalism.  Finally, I discuss examples of Salvadoran corporate 
philanthropy, based on a recent field study in El Salvador to support the model. 
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Corporate Philanthropy in El Salvador: 
An Altruistic and Political Legitimacy Model 
 
“The future of the country and the city depend on two things.  First is the FMLN:  How it 
acts and if it understands that governing is judged on results, and that it has to deliver. 
The second is the private sector, which has to understand it has to share a little more.”  
-- Hector Silva, former political ally of the FMLN, shortly after his 
election as mayor of San Salvador, April, 1997 (Farah, 1997). 
 
El Salvador, one of the smallest but most densely populated Latin American countries, is 
experiencing a period of regrowth and reconstruction after twelve years of civil war (Guevara, 
1997).  Following the 1992 Peace Accords, El Salvador is striving to create a neoliberal market 
economy and the role of private enterprise, both national and multinational, is critical to 
economic growth and development (Christian, 1995).  Investment is also required, however, in 
social and cultural reconstruction following the civil war.  As San Salvador mayor Hector Silva 
noted on election day in April 1997, a new relationship between the government and business 
sectors is essential to guarantee the resources necessary for such a transformation.  During the 
war years of the 1980s, Salvadoran public and private resources that might have otherwise been 
invested in health, education, arts, community, and welfare services were diverted to the war 
effort by both right and left-winged factions. Although international organizations provided most 
developmental and relief aid during this period, a few Salvadoran individuals and firms made 
donations to charitable causes as well. 
But unlike U.S. firms after World War II that used philanthropy to establish a strong 
presence in support of social and community services (Sharfman, 1994), the role and the extent of 
philanthropic behavior by the Salvadoran private sector is unclear.  Philanthropy in El Salvador 
has not been documented or explored,  nor is it a phenomenon that is easy to observe. 
This paper discusses corporate philanthropy as practiced by Salvadoran companies in El 
Salvador.  First, I review the literature that discusses trends and models of corporate philanthropy 
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to highlight some of the motives companies may have to participate in charitable activities 
(Cowton, 1987; Jones, 1994).  Second, I review the history of the Salvadoran private sector to 
provide a context that will help us understand current philanthropic behavior.  Third, I offer a 
model of Salvadoran philanthropy supported by two propositions:  that corporate philanthropic 
behavior by Salvadoran firms reflects individualism and paternalism, and is positioned as both an 
altruistic and a politically strategic activity (Simon, 1988).  Finally, I discuss examples of 
Salvadoran corporate philanthropy, based on recent field work in El Salvador to support the 
model. 
THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF SALVADORAN CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY  
The topic of corporate philanthropy is important in the Salvadoran context because it may 
provide evidence of the development of the private business sector in El Salvador.  An 
observation of patterns of philanthropy may suggest whether Salvadoran firms desire to adopt the 
traditional shareholder model of the firm, or a more enlightened stakeholder model of firm 
behavior (Roberts & King, 1989), in the country’s post-war environment.  The study of 
Salvadoran corporate philanthropy may also reveal how Salvadoran firms are adjusting to another 
significant pressure, the global economy.  The end of the Salvadoran civil war and global market 
pressures have driven Salvadoran firms to look beyond the their traditional markets and 
competitors to grow and survive.  Industry in El Salvador has traditionally been concentrated in 
the hands of a limited number of oligarchs, but the end of the war, freer trade, and falling barriers 
to entry have made it difficult for industry leaders to defend their markets both politically and 
economically.  A significant effort by Salvadoran firms to participate in corporate philanthropy 
may suggest that they recognize that by investing resources in the community, they may evoke a 
more favorable response from consumers and other stakeholders, creating a more positive 
business environment and increasing their ability to compete (Cochran & Wood, 1984). 
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TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY  
There is evidence that corporate philanthropy is becoming an important activity to firms 
in foreign countries.  Two particularly noteworthy trends that can be observed at the firm-level 
are the convergence of corporate philanthropy with other corporate programs, and the emergence 
of strategic philanthropy (Pasquero, 1991).  First, for many years corporate philanthropy was a 
marginal activity that was usually carried out by the CEO at his discretion.  But as the boundaries 
around corporate communications, public relations, community involvement, social 
responsibility, and even traditional advertising become increasingly blurred, philanthropy is 
becoming a better “fit” with other activities of the firm.  Second, philanthropy is becoming more 
strategic, as firms manage their donation decisions like other spending activities, using 
performance objectives and professional staffs to manage the firm’s charitable donations more 
effectively (Pasquero, 1991). 
Two macro-economic trends add to the importance of corporate philanthropy in foreign 
countries.  First, increased global competition requires that firms establish their competitive 
advantage from various sources.  Corporate philanthropy may help a firm gain brand recognition 
and loyalty, promote itself as a “socially-responsible” firm, or attract and maintain a work force. 
For example, a Brazilian firm created a private foundation to provide quality education to poor 
children, which in turn is expected to result in a better educated workforce (Otis, 1997). Second, 
the elimination of government agencies and reductions in state budgets that previously supported 
the arts and social services have stimulated the growth of the voluntary agencies and private 
foundations to provide services and/or economically support them.  More private voluntary 
agencies are trying to raise money from private corporations, as government support declines. 
Correspondingly, corporations are establishing foundations to channel these requests.  In the late 
1980s, five such organizations comprising over 600 corporate members were formed in Europe, 
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where strong and almost exclusive state support of the arts and social services had been the norm 
(Pasquero, 1991).  Otis (1997) notes that foundations have been established all over Latin 
America as a corporate response to social needs unmet by the public sector.  
MODELS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
Below I briefly review three models of corporate philanthropy to highlight the range of 
possible motives that firms may have for engaging in corporate philanthropy.  The first model 
holds that philanthropy is motivated by a desire to benefit another, while the other two models 
argue that philanthropy is expected to result in strategic benefits to the firm (Carroll, 1991; Wood, 
1991). 
The altruistic model of corporate philanthropy  
The altruistic model of corporate philanthropy (Sharfman, 1994; Useem, 1984) is a 
non-strategic explanation of corporate giving.  It argues that the firm uses social criteria to act in 
ways that are right for society.  Altruistic philanthropy is practiced with the singular goal of 
helping others, and it is independent from the operational pressures of making profit.  Altruism 
allows individual managers to pursue charitable goals that are not linked to corporate interests or 
performance.  Despite its noble goals, the altruistic model alone tends to be a weak explanation 
for corporate philanthropy even in the most pluralistic of societies, because it ignores the profit 
maximization goal and other strategic goals of the firm (Neiheisel, 1994).  
The profit maximization model of corporate philanthropy 
According to this model, corporate philanthropy must contribute to direct monetary gain 
like any other function of the corporation.  This model is considered to be driven by “enlightened 
self-interest” (Drucker, 1984), such that the corporation undertakes philanthropy only if it is in its 
direct economic benefit to do so (Bock, Goldschmid, Millstein, & Scherer, 1984).  For example, 
contributions may be used for community enhancement, under the argument that a livable 
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community is good for business because when the standard of living is increased, product demand 
is increased.  New corporate charity in Latin America is said to be largely motivated by the 
enlightened self-interest factor (Otis, 1977). 
Philanthropy can also maximize profits is by reducing corporate income taxes.  It is 
argued that the profit-maximizing effects of corporate philanthropy are evident in countries where 
charitable donations can be deducted from earnings (Galaskiewicz, 1985).  But tax benefits may 
not be a sufficient explanation for corporate philanthropic behavior.  For example, corporate 
donations increased sharply in the United States when the excess profits tax was imposed on 
companies in 1942 (Sharfman, 1994).  But after the excess profits tax was repealed, donations 
declined only temporarily and resumed the levels observed when the tax was in force.  Indeed, 
even in countries such as El Salvador where charitable donations are tax exempt, tax benefits may 
not explain philanthropic behavior.  Tax collection is quite inefficient in El Salvador, and 
represented less than 13% of GDP in 1996 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996). 
The political and institutional power model of corporate philanthropy 
This model posits that firms engage in philanthropy to maximize benefits, but not in the 
form of an economic return on investment.  Rather, the firm uses philanthropy to maximize its 
political return on investment.  The firm does whatever it takes to protect its wider corporate 
environment but always with the shareholders’ interests in mind (Neiheisel, 1994).  Using this 
model, the goal of corporate philanthropy is to coopt, neutralize, or win over problematic actors 
in the political environment (Burt, 1983), and to preserve corporate autonomy by establishing 
private initiatives as an alternative to the growth or interference of government.  Indeed, firms 
practice philanthropy to gain and hold power and legitimacy (Neiheisel, 1994) in the political and 
institutional sense.  It may be quite obvious that firms try to build a positive corporate image by 
sponsoring high-profile, major community events.  But less obvious, and perhaps more 
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importantly, such sponsorship is beneficial because it keeps politicians, regulators, and the public 
at large beholden to the corporation. 
A HISTORY OF THE SALVADORAN PRIVATE SECTOR 
The following discussion of the private business sector in El Salvador provides some 
historical context that may help explain contemporary philanthropic behavior of Salvadoran 
business organizations.  From the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century, Salvadoran 
business firms operated in a pre-industrial capitalist state (Baloyra, 1982), characterized by 
monopolized holdings of agricultural land.  A small number of families made large fortunes, 
based principally on coffee, and some sugar and cotton.  Around 1950 , immigrants began to 
settle in El Salvador and establish themselves in foreign trade, local wholesale and retail 
businesses (Aubey, 1969).  What evolved has been called a liberal-oligarchic state (Baloyra, 
1982), and it forced the landed oligarchy to share economic power with the new merchant faction. 
The result was the concentration of land, production, exports, finance, and political power that 
benefited those two groups alone at the exclusion of the majority of the population.  The 
Salvadoran work force had very limited supplier power with both sectors, because they were 
landless, uneducated,  and were not unionized (Norvell, 1995).  This remains true today. 
This monolith of power may have been effective for creating wealth during periods of 
protected markets and fair trade policies, particularly for the landed oligarchy whose wealth 
depended on valuable agricultural exports (Baloyra, 1982).  Today, however, agriculture is less 
important, and industry and commerce are the two major sources of Salvadoran GDP (US Dept. 
of Commerce, 1996).  But even for Salvadoran industrial and commercial firms, falling trade 
barriers and increased competition from foreign firms are threatening the local private sector and 
could lead to the decline of traditional Salvadoran business organizations. 
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The economic dominance of the Salvadoran business sector has traditionally translated 
into political dominance as well (Aubey, 1969; Neiheisel, 1994).  But notably during and after the 
civil war of the 1980s, it lost legitimacy with both its internal population and the external 
international community (Russell, 1984).  During the war, many private sector leaders were 
identified with the most conservative elements of the government which in the view of many 
national and international observers were responsible for the disappearance, torture, and murder 
of civilians.  Although business leaders did not as a rule participate directly in these atrocities, 
neither did they call for the government to halt them or to investigate reports that they occurred. 
During the war, the private sector conducted business as usual, maintained cordiality with and 
supported the government, and turned a blind eye when unpleasantries occurred.  By the late 
1980s, however, the private sector realized that that if the war continued, the national economy 
and business as they knew it might be irretrievably damaged.  The private sector began quietly 
urging the government to participate in peace negotiations with the FMLN rebels, if for no other 
reason but to salvage what was left of a sick economy. 
By 1992, peace was negotiated and the war ended.  By early 1997 the political 
organizations of the factions which were formerly at war with one another were sharing power in 
the Salvadoran legislative assembly and in mayorships across the country.  The largest and most 
significant organization of the Salvadoran private sector is on record as strongly supporting 
political pluralism, within the framework of a modern, democratic, and neoliberal economic 
system (ANEP, 1996).  And although the economy has recovered, or even rebounded, with a 
GDP growth of 6% in 1995 and 4.5% in 1996 plus an enviable single-digit inflation rate (US 
Department of Commerce, 1996), the Salvadoran business sector is struggling to regain its 
legitimacy with the people of El Salvador and with the international community.  The ANEP, an 
association of thirty-six industry organizations that claim to unite over 2,000 Salvadoran business 
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firms, is trying hard to convince the public that its member firms have been transformed and are 
indeed modern, forward-thinking, socially responsible organizational citizens.  Salvadoran firms 
seem to know that to compete in the global economy, they must be perceived as serious, 
legitimate business organizations with modern management philosophies and techniques, and 
cannot be seen as plantation managers of a backwards banana republic. 
A MODEL OF SALVADORAN CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
In the section below, I discuss two propositions that form the basis for a model of 
Salvadoran corporate philanthropy.  The first proposition is that corporate philanthropy in El 
Salvador is couched in altruism and reflects personal interests and paternalistic attitudes of firm 
leaders.  The second proposition posits that Salvadoran business firms that practice corporate 
philanthropy do so because they believe it increases their political legitimacy in the national and 
international community.  These propositions suggest that corporate philanthropy by Salvadoran 
firms can be explained by a model that conjoins two current models of corporate philanthropy. 
The model in this paper suggests that Salvadoran corporate philanthropy enlarges the 
characteristics of the altruistic model (Useem, 1984) and the political legitimacy model 
(Neiheisel, 1994) to create a unique variation of the strategic use of philanthropy.  By first 
couching philanthropy in altruistic terms, business leaders’ motives for corporate philanthropy are 
lauded, rather than doubted as they might be if they were explained by the profit maximization 
model.  This acceptance allows business leaders to practice philanthropy in paternalistic and 
individualistic ways.  However, beside the showpiece of altruism stands a strategic objective to 
maximize the political currency of the company by using philanthropy to increase the firm’s 
legitimacy as perceived by various stakeholder groups.  This model is illustrated in Figure 1.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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-------------------------------- 
Evidence of corporate philanthropy in El Salvador 
The following section is based on a seven-day field visit that I made to El Salvador in 
1997.  During this visit, I interviewed the executives of seven of the country’s principal trade and 
business associations whose membership are Salvadoran firms.  Other people interviewed 
included U.S. Embassy and Commerce officials, directors of Salvadoran private foundations, and 
university officials.  I did not interview executives of individual businesses during the visit. 
Instead, I held discussions with association executives to gain a preliminary impression of the 
perceived extent and relevance of corporate philanthropy in the Salvadoran context. 
The participation of the Salvadoran business sector in corporate philanthropy is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, and it is not practiced by the majority of business organizations. 
There is sympathy for and interest in the concept, however, and some officials predict that 
corporate philanthropy will increase (Chamber of Commerce, 1997).  Corporate philanthropy is 
probably more pervasive in El Salvador than it is in most other Latin American countries (US 
Embassy, 1997).  However, it is estimated that less than fifty very large national companies, 
many of which are in the banking industry, actively practice corporate philanthropy in El 
Salvador.  It is only within the  past fifteen years that these companies have created private 
philanthropic foundations to support causes such as education, hospitals, the elderly, women and 
children, churches, the environment, artists, and sports organizations. 
In the first part of this section, I discuss the first component of the model of Salvadoran 
corporate philanthropy.  I argue that the philanthropic activities of Salvadoran firms are framed 
by altruism, and reflect the individualistic interests and paternalistic attitudes of the leaders of the 
business firms that initiate them. 
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Individualistic philanthropy​.  The philanthropic activities of multinational corporations 
that operate in countries such as El Salvador may be characterized as strategic, clearly targeted, 
and linked to the overall objectives of the firm (Deresky, 1997: 504;  FUSADES, 1997).  In 
comparison, charitable contributions of Salvadoran companies tend to be more individualistic in 
nature.  Corporate charity in this context is idiosyncratic and reactive, reflecting the interests of 
individual business leaders, according to a former Exxon executive and current director of a 
Salvadoran think tank (FUSADES, 1997).  Salvadoran executives may support a pet project for 
an extended period of time, or provide one-time support to a random request for funds, without 
thought as to how such actions fit with the company’s overall strategy. 
While no overall strategy emerges for supporting social services through corporate 
philanthropy, Salvadoran companies will from time to time pool their resources and jointly 
support causes.  Participation even at this level is likely to be individual, focusing on the efforts of 
the individual corporate leader, although it is often packaged to the public as an effort promoted 
by the company (ASI, 1997).  Individual business leaders are beginning to serve on volunteer 
social service boards or not-for-profit foundation boards.  The extent of their service tends to be 
limited to donations of time, however, rather than money (ASI, 1997). 
Paternalistic philanthropy​.  Management styles in El Salvador and other Latin American 
countries are frequently typed as paternalistic (Deresky, 1997; Teagarden, Butler, & Von Glinow, 
1992), and paternalism may be one explanation for corporate philanthropy in El Salvador. 
Paternalism in the workplace suggests that the boss is the ​patron​, or father figure, whose role it is 
to take care of the workers by making occasional gestures of generosity to them.  Examples of 
paternalistic corporate philanthropy might include the construction of soccer fields for employees 
on the factory site, and the distribution of holiday food baskets.  This type of philanthropy is 
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motivated by the leader’s desire to win or keep the sympathy of the employees as well as the 
favor of the public at large (Chamber of Commerce, 1997). 
One example of paternalistic corporate charity is the “social strengthening” program of 
the Salvadoran development foundation, called FUSADES.  FUSADES’ objective is to “promote, 
within a system of individual liberties, economic and social development to improve the living 
conditions for all Salvadorans” (FUSADES, 1995).  Its social program has paternalistic 
undertones, to “assist communities in education, health, and nutrition projects” (FUSADES, 
1995).  The social effort is very minor compared with FUSADES’ six major business 
development programs that include agricultural diversification, total quality management, export 
promotion, legal and economic research, and entrepreneurship (FUSADES, 1995). 
The best known Salvadoran corporate charitable foundations are noted for their 
paternalistic style of philanthropy.  They include the Meza Foundation, created by the Murray 
Meza family who owns the country’s major brewery and bottling company; the Sigma 
Foundation, the Poma family’s Salvadoran Foundation for health; FUNTER, a foundation that 
holds an annual telethon to benefits the handicapped; and the De Sola Foundation (US Agency for 
International Development, 1997).  
Activities of the Salvadoran Rotary Club illustrate the combination of a highly 
individualistic approach to philanthropy, complemented by paternalistic gestures.  Membership in 
the Salvadoran Rotary Club is exclusively individual, and not representative of the members’ 
companies in any way, although the Rotary Club is an “extension of corporate philanthropy” 
(Rotary Club, 1997).  Major Rotary Club projects include the Gift of Life program that helps 
young people who suffer from heart disease, a polio immunization campaign, a literacy campaign 
that raised money for books and supplies, and tuition scholarships to help young teachers finish 
their teaching degrees (Rotary Club, 1997).  
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These individualistic and paternalistic efforts of the Salvadoran business sector are 
promoted publicly as benevolent deeds that are good for those less fortunate, and thus good for 
society as a whole.  Donors avoid acknowledging that the philanthropic acts may provide some 
economic or political benefit to the firm.  On the contrary, they position their efforts as unselfish 
acts, not self-interested acts, that are completely motivated by a desire to benefit others.  This 
suggests that philanthropy is motivated in part by altruism, or that philanthropists want their acts 
to be perceived as altruistically motivated.  Salvadoran corporate philanthropic activities are 
generally welfare initiatives that provide short-term benefits to disadvantaged populations, and 
few provide medium- or long-term solutions to the social problems they address.  Based on this 
discussion I posit the following:  
Proposition 1:  Corporate philanthropy by Salvadoran firms in El Salvador  
is motivated by altruism, and reflects individual interests and  
paternalistic attitudes of the firms’ leaders 
 
In the next section, I discuss the second component of the model, the political legitimacy 
component.  I argue that Salvadoran corporate philanthropists practice philanthropy because it is 
good for business, and because they believe it increases their political legitimacy in the national 
and international community. 
Philanthropy is good for business​.  FUSADES was created by the private sector to 
promote socio-economic development throughout the country.  FUSADES takes credit for 
forming many private foundations at the local community level that have “begun to take 
responsibility for social needs” (FUSADES, 1995).  The impetus for the creation of these 
non-profit foundations is “a level of consciousness achieved by the businessperson to share with 
the less fortunate in the country” (FUSADES, 1997).  Some business leaders admit that 
Salvadoran companies cannot be competitive even in the national marketplace if consumer 
14 
 
incomes are low and the quality of life of much of the population is substandard.  They are 
beginning to recognize that national competitive advantage is based on strong local demand 
conditions which emerge from a prosperous local population (Porter, 1990).  Thus, corporate 
philanthropy is an attempt to improve the standard of living of people of lesser means. 
Examples that illustrate how corporate philanthropy is driven by the desire to benefit the 
business include the efforts of the Poma family. The Poma family businesses are diversified and 
large by Salvadoran standards.  The Poma family owns the major automobile dealerships in the 
country, the auto service and parts companies, plus several large retail establishments.  The 
Poma’s are also leaders in corporate philanthropy, and have created several not for profit 
foundations to support health and education projects (U.S. Agency for International 
Development, 1997; Chamber of Commerce, 1997). 
Perhaps the largest philanthropic project of the Poma family is a private, not for profit 
university that teaches business administration, called ESEN.  The Poma Foundation, together 
with four other firms -- the Salvadoran airline, a major textile company, the cement company, and 
a large Salvadoran printing company -- donated significant sums of money to create the ESEN “to 
respond to deficiencies in the training of business students at the undergraduate level” (ESEN, 
1997).  Dissatisfied with the way business students were being prepared by the country’s state 
universities, ESEN was created to provide a reliable supply of well-trained people for the 
business community.  ESEN does not intend to be an elite institution, since 62% of the students 
receive full tuition scholarships.  In addition, the four year program that includes a one year 
internship stresses business ethics which is taught by local business people (ESEN, 1997).  This 
focus on ethics reflects the view that Salvadoran business leaders have “changed since the end of 
the war,” now recognizing the need to train a new, modern, and ethically responsible business 
professional. 
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The Tesak family’s philanthropy provides another example.  Pablo Tesak is the owner of 
the largest snack food manufacturer in Central America.  A 1977 strike at the Salvadoran 
company resulted in one death and several wounded, including Tesak.  The tragedy may have 
transformed the company, which has become a model of enlightened self-interest.  Tesak 
explains,  “If children can’t do better than their parents, there’s going to be a social conflict. 
Everyone should have the chance to progress” (Gruson, 1990).  Tesak’s company is now noted 
for its innovative employee benefits, including a school and literacy program, pharmacy, a 
commissary, some profit sharing, and loan program for employees and relatives of employees 
(Gruson, 1990).  The idea behind these policies is to benefit employee’s family members as well 
as the employees themselves, which will result in loyal and productive workers (Long, 1997) with 
greater consumer buying power.  Tesak claims that fellow Salvadoran business leaders are 
beginning to understand that they can earn greater profits when the poor earn more and when the 
economy is strong (Gruson, 1990). 
Other noteworthy companies include the Salvadoran airline company, which has the 
reputation for treating its workers well and making significant charitable donations to many 
causes, including the ESEN university discussed above.  Some of the offshore textile companies 
in El Salvador, known as the ​maquilas​, claim to support the local communities where the plants 
are located by building school classrooms, health centers, markets, day care centers, town halls, 
and providing garbage trucks and medicines to the clinic (ASIC, 1997).  Although the ​maquila 
plants are generally not owned by local business people, their corporate philanthropic behavior is 
noted because it follows the “philanthropy is good for business” model. 
Philanthropy as a way to increase political legitimacy​.  The ANEP’s position on the 
social commitment of the firm illustrates the private sector’s intent to use corporate charity to 
enhance its legitimacy.  In a recent public manifesto, the ANEP stated that its purpose is to unite 
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“all national sectors to work together in the construction of a new society, that strives for 
permanent progress for all, within a framework of social peace and true democracy, for the 
benefit of future generations” (ANEP, 1996).  ANEP believes that the deterioration of social and 
economic conditions for the majority of Salvadorans must be reversed, yet it considers the 
government is primarily responsible for this reversal.  In a recent declaration, the executive 
director of ANEP suggests that the private sector has a duty to help eliminate poverty, in 
partnership with the public sector.  A more careful reading, however,  reveals that ANEP believes 
that the private sector’s responsibility is limited to generating jobs, paying taxes, competing 
fairly, and making profits (Vidal, 1996).  Mentioned later are the efforts of some Salvadoran 
firms to provide health care and training to employees, as extraordinary private sector efforts to 
meet its social responsibility. 
ANEP says it would like to make corporate giving a part of the private sector’s culture 
(ANEP, 1997).  ANEP believes that although corporate philanthropy currently exists in El 
Salvador, it is very limited and it lacks the notoriety that it merits (ANEP, 1997).  Specifically, 
ANEP’s goal is to form a comprehensive not for profit foundation to support social projects, but it 
intends to fund it with donations from international organizations, not with corporate donations. 
These examples demonstrate how the private sector may use the framework of corporate social 
responsibility and philanthropy to position itself as an exemplary citizen and increase its 
legitimacy to national and international constituencies.  But if one scratches below the surface, 
there is little evidence that the private sector is committed to social responsibility beyond its 
economic domain, and there is no evidence that it extends to the discretionary domain (Wood, 
1991).  Based on this discussion, I posit the following:  
Proposition 2:  Salvadoran firms that practice corporate philanthropy  do so  
because they perceive that it is good for business, and that it increases  
their political legitimacy in the national and international community​. 
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DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This paper proposed a model of corporate philanthropy in contemporary El Salvador.  I 
argued that the corporate philanthropic activities by Salvadoran firms combines the characteristics 
of the altruistic and strategic positioning models of philanthropy.  On the one hand, corporate 
philanthropy in El Salvador occurs so that it will be perceived as an altruistic effort, and it reflects 
the highly personal interests and paternalistic attitudes of the leaders of Salvadoran firms.  In 
addition to these altruistic drivers, an equally compelling motive for corporate giving is the desire 
of Salvadoran firms to enlarge the scope of their political legitimacy before national and 
international constituencies.  
These are not competing propositions.  In fact, they can comfortably co-exist within a 
model of corporate philanthropy.  Krebs (1991) notes that “virtually all helping behaviors are 
aimed at enhancing the welfare of both the self and others.”  Similarly, Batson & Shaw (1991) 
argue that while a single motive for a single action cannot be both altruistic and egoistic, various 
motives for that single action can exist simultaneously.  In the case of Salvadoran corporate 
philanthropy, however, the altruistic motive is the one that donors most strenuously promote.  The 
political legitimacy motive is not generally acknowledged, making it less obvious and apparent.  
The model offered in this paper, and the propositions that attempt to explain it, may be 
tested to determine if there is empirical support for this explanation of Salvadoran corporate 
philanthropic behavior.  Executives could be surveyed to determine the level and extent of 
philanthropic activity in their individual firms.  Questions could be asked to determine to what 
extent corporate philanthropy is driven by altruistic motives and/or political legitimacy concerns, 
and if these activities represent individual interests of firm leaders and are paternalistic in nature. 
Access to the leaders of these firms may be possible through the contacts I established with 
association executives during the field study..  The directors of the two largest associations 
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offered to support such a study and to provide their mailing lists.  Surveys would best be 
conducted by personal interviews, given the lack of reliability of the Salvadoran postal service 
and the likely reluctance of business leaders to respond to a “cold call” survey.  It would be very 
challenging to collect any sort of financial data, including sales data and amounts of philanthropic 
contributions, since most Salvadoran firms are privately held and principals may be reluctant to 
divulge this information. 
Another interesting research question related to the model proposed in this paper is 
whether or not corporate philanthropy in El Salvador will increase, decrease, or remain the same 
over time.  This question is important for two reasons.  First, pressing economic inequities and 
deteriorating social conditions suggest that the public sector will tap the private sector for 
resources to help meet the needs of the Salvadoran population..  Second, some authors have 
suggested that corporate philanthropy may be a proxy for the degree to which a business 
organization embraces a modern, stakeholder model of the firm (Pasquero, 1991; Smith, 1994; 
Useem, 1988).  The comments by the new mayor of San Salvador, quoted at the beginning of this 
paper, suggest that a new civic partnership between the public and the private sectors must be 
forged to guarantee growth and prosperity for Salvador’s citizens. 
It would be useful to study, for example, the effects of global competition on the 
philanthropic efforts of Salvadoran firms.  An initial observation of the structure of industry in El 
Salvador suggests that there may be a positive correlation between the level of a firm’s 
involvement in corporate philanthropy and the level of market share held by that firm in its 
industry.  Firms that tend to emerge as the most active and generous corporate contributors are 
also firms that are dominant players in their industries, either as oligopolists or near monopolists. 
Therefore, some observers predict that the limited corporate philanthropy that exists in El 
Salvador will decrease as trade policies become increasingly liberal.  This will occur because the 
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entry of strong foreign competitors from Mexico, the United States , and other countries will 
threaten the monopolistic position of many Salvadoran firms, putting an additional squeeze on 
their profits.  The end result may be fewer donations to charitable causes, and a decline of 
corporate philanthropic behavior.  
These same observers tend to agree that the Salvadoran private sector desires to ​appear​ to 
be legitimate, modern business organizations.  But they doubt that Salvadoran companies truly 
want to ​become ​modern business organizations that embrace the stakeholder model (Roberts & 
King, 1989).  As soon as their dominant market position begins to erode -- independent of past or 
future profit levels -- they predict that philanthropy will decrease.  
A comment by the executive director of one of El Salvador’s industrial associations may 
be illustrative.  He emphasized that the role of the private sector in the country’s social 
development is “only and exclusively to be efficient and to create jobs.”  In fact, he noted that the 
private sector should not dedicate resources to improving the social situation other than trying to 
improve the productive capability of the nation.  Indeed, the responsibility for resolving social 
problems rests with the Salvadoran government and international donor organizations (ASI, 
1997). 
Philanthropy exists in a very unique and rudimentary form in El Salvador, and its 
presence raises several interesting research questions about the future of the Salvadoran private 
sector.  Further research on corporate philanthropy among Salvadoran firms may shed important 
light on how national firms in developing countries are adapting to local pressures to participate 
in a civic, as well as a commercial, role in their communities.  Additionally, the study of 
philanthropy in this environment may inform us how these firms are adjusting to global 
competition that may threaten their traditional market share, profits, and dominant position in 
their own national markets. 
 
20 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (ANEP).  1996.  ​El manifiesto salvadoreno​.  San 
Salvador:  ANEP. 
 
Asociación Salvadorena de Industria (ASI), General Manager. Conversation with author.  San 
Salvador, El Salvador.  May 2, 1997. 
 
Asociación Salvadorena de la Industria de la Confección (ASIC), Executive Director. 
Conversation with author.  San Salvador, El Salvador.  May 2, 1997. 
 
Aubey, R.T.  1969.  Entrepreneurial formation in El Salvador.  ​Explorations in Entrepreneurial 
History​, 6(3): 268-285. 
 
Baloyra, E.A.  1982.  ​El Salvador in transition​.  Chapel Hill, NC:  The University of North 
Carolina Press. 
 
Batson, C.D., & Shaw, L.L.  1991.  Evidence for altruism:  Toward a pluralism of prosocial 
motives.  ​Psychological Inquiry​, 2(2): 107-122. 
 
Bock, B., Goldschmid, H.J., Millstein, I.M., & Scherer, F.M.  1984.  ​The impact of the modern 
corporation​.  New York:  Columbia University Press. 
 
Burt, R.S.  1983.  ​Corporate profits and co-optation​.  New York:  Academic Press. 
 
Carroll, A.B.  1991.  The pyramid of corporate social responsibility.  ​Business Horizons​, 34(4): 
39-48. 
 
Chamber of Commerce of El Salvador, Director of Public Relations.  Conversation with author. 
San Salvador, El Salvador, April 30, 1997. 
 
Cochran, P.L. & Wood, R.A.  Corporate social responsibility and financial performance. 
Academy of Management Journal​, 27:42-56. 
 
Cowton, C.J.  1987.  Corporate philanthropy in the United Kingdom.  ​Journal of Business Ethics​, 
6: 553-558. 
 
Drucker, P.  1989.  ​The new realities​.  New York:  Harper & Row. 
 
Escuela Superior de Economia y Negocios (ESEN), Executive Director.  Conversation with 
author.  San Salvador, El Salvador.  May 2, 1997. 
 
Farah, Douglas.  1997.  Salvadoran left wins via ballot box.  ​The Washington Post International​, 
April 22. 
 
Fundación Salvadorena de Desarrollo (FUSADES), Executive Director. Conversation with 
author.  San Salvador, El Salvador.  April 30, 1997. 
 
21 
 
Fundación Salvadorena de Desarrollo (FUSADES).  1995.  ​Annual Report 1995​.  San Salvador: 
FUSADES. 
 
Galaskiewicz, J.  1985.  Professional networks and the institutionalization of a single mind set. 
American Sociological Review​, 50. 
 
Gruson, L.  1990.  Salvadoran company wins peace of its own.  ​The New York Times 
International​, October 3: A9. 
 
Guevara, Julia A.  1997.  El Salvador:  “Exploration of the re-emergence of volunteerism and 
philanthropy in a post-war culture.”  Unpublished monograph of the School of Social 
Work.  Allendale, MI: Grand Valley State University.  
 
Jones, R.E.  1994.  A theory of firm philanthropy:  The philanthropic capacity of the firm. 
Proceedings of the International Association of Business and Society, Hilton Head, SC: 
379-384.  
 
Krebs, D.L.  1991.  Altruism and egoism:  A false dichotomy?  ​Psychological Inquiry​, 2(2): 
137-138. 
 
Long, T.  Conversation with author.  San Salvador, El Salvador.  May 1, 1997. 
 
Neiheisel, S.R.  1994.  ​Corporate strategy and the politics of goodwill​.  New York:  Peter Lang. 
 
Norvell, S.  1995.  El Salvador.  In S. Christian (Ed.), ​Investing and Selling in Latin America​: 
136-138.  Shawnee Mission, KS:  Morning Light.  
 
Otis, J.  1997.  Higher ground:  Latin America’s business leaders mix social vision and profits. 
Latin Trade​, 5(9): 89-92. 
 
Pasquero, J.  1991.  Trends in international corporate philanthropy.  In K. Paul (Ed.), 
Contemporary issues in business and society in the United States and abroad​: 225-257. 
Lewiston, NY:  The Edwin Mellin Press.  
 
Porter, M.E.  1990.  ​The competitive advantage of nations​.  New York:  The Free Press.  
 
Roberts, N.C. & King, P.J.  1989.  The stakeholder audit goes public.  ​Organizational Dynamics 
(Winter):  63-79. 
 
Rotary Club of El Salvador, President.  Conversation with author.  San Salvador, El Salvador. 
April 30, 1997. 
 
Russell, Philip L.  1984.  ​El Salvador in crisis​.  Austin, TX:  Colorado River Press. 
 
Sharfman, Mark   1994.  Changing institutional rules:  The evolution of corporate philanthropy, 
1883-1953.  ​Business & Society​, 33 (3): 236-269.  
 
22 
 
Simon, W.  1988.  Taking philanthropy seriously.  ​Alternatives in Philanthropy​, (September). 
Capital Research Center. 
 
Smith, C.  1994.  The new corporate philanthropy.  ​Harvard Business Review​, 72 (3): 105-116. 
 
Teagarden, M.B., Butler, M.C., & Von Glinow, M.  1992.  Mexico’s ​maquiladora ​industry: 
Where strategic human resource management makes a difference.  ​Organizational 
Dynamics ​(Winter): 34-47. 
 
U.S. Agency for International Development, Economist.  Conversation with author.  San 
Salvador, El Salvador.  April 28, 1997. 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce.  1996.  El Salvador:  Economic trends and outlook.  ​Country 
Commercial Guide​.  Washington, DC:  International Trade Administration: 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Commercial Officer.  Conversation with author.  San Salvador, 
El Salvador.  April 28, 1997. 
 
Useem, M.  1984.  ​The inner circle:  Large corporations and the rise of business political activity 
in the US and UK​.  New York:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Vidal, J.H.  1996.  Reducción de la pobreza:  Un rol para el sector privado?  ​Unidad Empresarial 
7(41): 51-59.  San Salvador:  ANEP. 
 
Wood, D.J.  1991.  Corporate social performance revisited.  ​Academy of Management Review​, 
16(4): 691-718 
 
23 
 
